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INTRODUCTION 
In the early morning of May 9, 2010, no one had Jane Doe’s 
“six.”1 When someone “has your six,” it means they have your back 
and will act in your best interest.2 A fellow West Point cadet raped 
Doe while on a walk around campus after hours.3 During the walk, the 
fellow cadet offered Doe a few sips of alcohol, which did not mix well 
with the sedative she took earlier in the evening.4 The mixture caused 
Doe to lose consciousness, and it was at that point the fellow cadet 
raped her.5 Doe sought care from the West Point health clinic the next 
day, and, although she reported being sexually assaulted by a friend, 
the clinic did not collect or preserve any forensic evidence from the 
assault.6 Concerned with the possibility of a tarnished reputation, 
retaliation from her peers, and punishment for being out after hours, 
Doe decided to file a restricted report.7 Doe later resigned from the 
military and was honorably discharged on August 13, 2010.8 It was 
                                                   
 1. See Doe v. Hagenbeck, 870 F.3d 36, 39 (2d Cir. 2017). 
 2. See Who We Are, GOT YOUR 6, https://gotyour6.org/about/who-we-are/ 
[https://perma.cc/ND28-56ER] (last visited Nov. 26, 2018) (explaining that the term 
originated from World War I fighter pilots and signifies the idea of loyalty and 
cooperation within the military). 
 3. See Hagenbeck, 870 F.3d at 39; see also About West Point, WEST POINT, 
https://www.usma.edu/About/SitePages/Home.aspx [https://perma.cc/HTJ3-L4DK] 
(last visited Nov. 26, 2018) (explaining the history of the military academy as a 
historic institute for United States Army training and education). 
 4. See Hagenbeck, 870 F.3d at 39. Doe was prescribed a sedative to help 
her sleep. See id. 
 5. See id. “Doe contends that Smith ‘was aware that [she] had lost 
consciousness and took advantage,’ attacking her and having ‘forcible, non-
consensual intercourse with her.’” Id. 
 6. See id. at 39. The clinic provided Doe with emergency contraception, 
tested her for sexually transmitted diseases, and informed her that she had signs of 
vaginal tearing. See id.  
 7. See id. at 40 (“It was common knowledge among the cadets that 
successful women in the military did not report incidents of sexual assault.”). 
 8. See id.  
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not until April 26, 2013, that Doe filed a complaint in the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of New York.9  
Doe pleaded four independent claims of action: (1) a Bivens 
claim10 based on an alleged Fifth Amendment due process violation 
against her two superior officers, Lieutenant General Franklin Lee 
Hagenbeck and Brigadier General William E. Rapp;11 (2) a Bivens 
claim premised on an alleged Fifth Amendment equal protection 
violation against the Lieutenant General and the Brigadier General; 
(3) a claim for breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing under 
28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) against the United States;12 and (4) a Federal 
Tort Claims Act (FTCA) claim against the United States alleging 
negligent supervision, negligent training, negligence, negligent 
infliction of emotional distress, and abuse of process.13 Accordingly, 
the material issue arising from Doe v. Hagenbeck was whether a 
service member may bring a claim against the military for injuries 
sustained incident to his or her service.14 
Sexual assault in the military is nothing new, with it first gaining 
public attention after the 1991 Tailhook Scandal.15 The current 
                                                   
 9. See id. On September 4, 2013, Doe filed an amended complaint. Id. 
 10. See id. A Bivens action, generated from Bivens v. Six Unknown Named 
Agents, 456 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1972), generally refers to actions for damages when 
there has been a violation of the United States Constitution by a federal officer acting 
under federal authority. See Bivens Actions, LEGAL INFO. INST., 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/Bivens_actions [https://perma.cc/K9RA-3SN9] 
(last visited Nov. 26, 2018). 
 11. See Hagenbeck, 870 F.3d at 39-40. Lieutenant General Hagenbeck was 
the Superintendent of West Point, and in that role he chaired the Sexual Assault 
Review Board, which oversees sexual assault prevention and response at West Point. 
See id. at 38. Brigadier General Rapp was Commandant of Cadets at West Point and 
oversaw the training and administration of the cadets. See id. 
 12. See id. at 40. The Little Tucker Act, passed in 1887, gives the district 
courts original jurisdiction, concurrent with the Court of Federal claims, of any civil 
claim or claim against the United States exceeding $10,000, founded either upon: the 
Constitution, an act of Congress, a regulation of an executive department, any express 
or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages 
in cases not grounded in tort. See The Little Tucker Act, LSU MED. & PUB. HEALTH 
L., https://biotech.law.lsu.edu/map/TheLittleTuckerAct.html 
 [https://perma.cc/NB5L-VF7Q] (last visited Nov. 26, 2018). 
 13. See Hagenbeck, 870 F.3d at 40-41. The defendants filed a motion to 
dismiss, which the district court granted in part and denied in part, leaving only the 
Bivens claim alleging that the defendants violated Doe’s equal protection rights. See 
id. at 38. 
 14. See id. at 42.  
 15. See Stephanie Russell-Kraft, ‘Continuum of Harm’: The Military Has 
Been Fighting Sexual Assault in Its Ranks for Decades, but Women Say It’s Still 
Happening, TASK & PURPOSE (Feb. 7, 2018), https://taskandpurpose.com/military-
sexual-assault-me-too/ [https://perma.cc/K9PT-VJM9] (explaining that the modern 
era of sexual assault awareness in the military started with Tailhook).  
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Department of Defense (DOD) policy defines sexual assault as 
intentional sexual contact that covers a broad range of categories such 
as rape, sexual assault, forcible sodomy, and the attempt of each of 
these actions.16 While reporting procedures have seen improvements, 
survivors17 of sexual assault have seen little recourse within the 
military justice system.18 In the civil courts, justice is severely 
hindered due, in part, to the Feres Doctrine’s limit on active military 
service members’ ability to bring claims against their perpetrators in 
civil court.19 In Feres v. United States, the Supreme Court held that the 
government is not liable for injuries to service members that arise out 
of activities incident to their service.20  
Recent scholarship on the Feres Doctrine studies its effect on 
justice for military sexual assault and how the Doctrine has evolved 
through case law.21 This Note analyzes the gap between the need for 
the Feres Doctrine22 and the need for a clear definition of what 
constitutes the “incident to service” standard.23 The Supreme Court has 
                                                   
 16. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., ANNUAL REPORT ON SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE 
MILITARY: FISCAL YEAR 2016, 6 (2016), http://www.sapr.mil/public/docs/reports/ 
FY16_Annual/FY16_SAPRO_Annual_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/KZ33-8838]. 
“In this report, DOD uses the term ‘sexual assault’ to refer to a range of crimes, 
including rape, sexual assault, forcible sodomy, aggravated sexual assault, aggravated 
sexual contact, abusive sexual contact, and attempts to commit these offenses, as 
defined by the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).” Id.  
 17. See Gwendolyn Wu, ‘Survivor’ Versus ‘Victim’: Why Choosing Your 
Words Carefully Is Important, HELLOFLO (Mar. 16, 2016), http://helloflo.com/ 
survivor-vs-victim-why-choosing-your-words-carefully-is-important/ 
[https://perma.cc/EN2L-XKJK] (explaining that the word “victim” implies 
helplessness and invokes a sensation of pity, but the word “survivor” invokes the 
sense that a person can take back control of their life). 
 18. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., STATISTICAL DATA ON SEXUAL ASSAULT 15, 19 
(2016), http://www.sapr.mil/public/docs/reports/FY16_Annual/Appendix_B_ 
Statistical_Section.pdf [https://perma.cc/LP2F-YJXQ] (noting that out of over 6,000 
reports of sexual assault, 1,331 were deemed to have had substantiated claims, and of 
those, only 791 court-martials were initiated).  
 19. See LESTER S. JAYSON & ROBERT C. LONGSTRETH, HANDLING FEDERAL 
TORT CLAIMS § 5A.02 (Matthew Bender ed., 2018). 
 20. See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950). 
 21. See generally Ann-Marie Woods, A “More Searching Judicial Inquiry”: 
The Justiciability of Intra-Military Sexual Assault Claims, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1329 
(2014); Jonathon Turley, Pax Militaris: The Feres Doctrine and the Retention of 
Sovereign Immunity in the Military System of Governance, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 
(2003); Anne R. Riley, United States v. Johnson: Expansion of the Feres Doctrine to 
Include Servicemembers’ FTCA Suits Against Civilian Government Employees, 42 
VAND. L. REV. 233 (1989). 
 22. See Stencel Aero Eng’g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 671-73 
(1976). 
 23. See infra Part III (analyzing a potentially viable test for defining the 
“incident to service” test). 
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repeatedly refused to define or create a rule for this exception, instead 
stating that it is Congress’s duty to provide further explanation.24 The 
broad application of the “incident to service” standard has halted 
military service members’ pursuit of justice.25 While there are 
foreseeable reasons for having the Feres Doctrine in place, such as the 
prevention of suits brought for injuries that occur during the normal 
course of a highly dangerous profession, the broad application of the 
“incident to service” standard runs counter to the legislature’s intent 
for the FTCA.26 Because the Supreme Court has created the language 
of “incident to service,” it is the responsibility of the Court, not 
Congress, to define the standard.27 
Part I of this Note examines the military’s sexual assault policies 
and procedures through the lens of the infamous Tailhook scandal.28 It 
also details the current reporting procedures, investigation schema, 
and proposed legislation to rectify reporting issues within the 
military.29 Part II analyzes the Feres Doctrine and the ambiguous 
“incident to service” standard.30 Finally, Part III argues that the 
Supreme Court must adopt a new test for the “incident to service” 
standard that equitably weighs the interest of justice for the survivor 
and the original intent of Congress.31 
I. THE MILITARY’S SEXUAL ASSAULT PROBLEM 
In the aftermath of the Tailhook incident—a public military 
disaster—the military implemented changes to rectify the protocols 
                                                   
 24. See United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 57 (1985); see also Feres v. 
United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950). 
 25. See JAYSON & LONGSTRETH, supra note 19, § 5A.02 (explaining the 
difficulties service member litigants face in order to pursue a claim against the 
government). 
 26. See generally The Feres Doctrine: An Examination of This Military 
Exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2002) [hereinafter Committee Hearing] (arguing that the 
broad application of the Feres Doctrine has unnecessarily hindered military victims 
and their families from recovering from the military’s negligence).  
 27. See infra Part III (explaining how the court should interpret the “incident 
to service” standard in particular circumstances). 
 28. See infra Part I (detailing the reporting schema of the past and how it has 
changed to its current form). 
 29. See infra Part I (emphasizing reporting issues manifested within 
reporting schemas). 
 30. See infra Part II (detailing Feres and its progenies and their effects on 
governmental litigation). 
 31. See infra Part III (proposing a new analysis for the “incident to service” 
standard). 
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for responding to sexual assault that were in place as the time.32 These 
changes included implementing a military reporting system and 
having criminal investigations remain within the military sector.33 
However, because of this private criminal reporting and investigative 
system, survivors are sometimes unsatisfied with their options for 
justice.34 
A. Tailhook and Its Aftermath 
Beginning in 1956, the annual Tailhook Convention started as a 
naval reunion; it quickly expanded to include a number of naval 
aviation seminars and professional development activities.35 However, 
the unofficial reputation of the 1991 Tailhook Convention was that of 
an out of control “frat” party like those seen in movies or on TV.36 This 
reputation and the history of rowdy behavior manifested itself in the 
existence of the “gauntlet,” an unofficial section of the hotel where 
most of the sexual assault incidents took place.37 Over the course of 
the weekend, ninety men and women were sexually assaulted at the 
1991 Tailhook Convention.38 Between September 5 and September 7, 
1991, the United States Navy opened the country’s eyes to a problem 
plaguing the military through one of its most embarrassing moments.39 
                                                   
 32. See infra Sections I.A-C (detailing the Tailhook scandal). 
 33. See Woods, supra note 21, at 1350 (explaining that the primary 
investigator and first adjudicator of sexual assault cases is the commanding officer, 
not public police investigators, and these officers have incentives to dismiss claims 
within their units).  
 34. See THE INVISIBLE WAR (Chain Camera Pictures 2012) (detailing the 
struggles survivors must go through in reporting their assaults and how these results 
have the possibility of negatively affecting their careers). 
 35. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., THE TAILHOOK REPORT: THE 
OFFICIAL INQUIRY INTO THE EVENTS OF TAILHOOK ‘91, 15 (1993). The Tailhook 
Association, the organizer of the convention, was a private organization comprised of 
active duty, reserve, and retired Navy and Marine Corps aviators. See id. The 
association was named after the hook that grabs planes when they land on carrier 
decks. See Tailhook: Scandal Time, NEWSWEEK (July 5, 1995), 
http://www.newsweek.com/tailhook-scandal-time-200362 [https://perma.cc/3JAE-
YQG3]. During this time the event moved from San Diego to Las Vegas. See id. 
 36. See NEWSWEEK, supra note 35.  
 37. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 35, at 38. Most of the 
assaults took place in the third-floor corridor known as the “gauntlet.” Id. Here, 
women would be groped, undressed, and assaulted by officers as they made their way 
back to their rooms. See T. S. NELSON, FOR LOVE OF COUNTRY: CONFRONTING RAPE 
AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE U.S. MILITARY 57 (2002). 
 38. See Michael Winerip, Revisiting the Military’s Tailhook Scandal, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 13, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/13/booming/revisiting-the-
militarys-tailhook-scandal-video.html [https://perma.cc/L5T4-9XEL]. 
 39. See generally NELSON, supra note 37. 
 Who’s Got Your Six? 993 
The Tailhook incident began a national conversation about sexual 
assault within the United States military, resulting in major changes 
and personnel shake-ups.40 
Lieutenant Paula Coughlin, an admiral’s aide who was assaulted 
during the convention, was one of the first survivors to speak publicly 
about the crimes that occurred at Tailhook.41 When she first reported 
what took place to her superior officer, her superior officer treated it 
as nothing more than an out of control party.42 A serious investigation 
started only after the news about the assaults broke nationwide.43 At 
the conclusion of the investigation, the Inspector General found a total 
of ninety sexual assault survivors from the 1991 Tailhook 
Convention.44 
Despite the utter embarrassment and mishandling of the initial 
Tailhook incident, it was not until 2005 that the military created a 
sexual assault response and prevention program.45 Today, each branch 
of the military has a specialized program for the sole purpose of 
responding to issues of sexual assault.46 The main office for sexual 
assault education and prevention in the DOD is the Sexual Assault 
Prevention and Response Office (SAPRO), and it is responsible for 
                                                   
 40. See id. at 58-59. It was not until Paula Coughlin went public with what 
happened to her did the military take real action. See id. The Secretary of the Navy, 
H. Lawrence Garrett III, resigned and the Acting Secretary of the Navy, J. Daniel 
Howard, supported numerous changes including: a one-day stand-down; the 
development of a Standing Committee on Women in the Navy and Marine Corps; the 
introduction of sexual harassment as an offence under the UCMJ; and a call to all 
involved in the 1991 Tailhook scandal to come forward. See id. 
 41. See id. at 57.  
 42. See NEWSWEEK, supra note 35. “Even though scores of drunken officers 
assaulted at least 26 women, 14 of them officers, the navy initially treated Tailhook 
‘91 as little more than a fraternity party that got out of hand.” Id. When Lt. Coughlin 
reported the assault the next day to her superior officer, he acknowledged the behavior 
but minimized it and blamed her for being around the drunken group. See NELSON, 
supra note 37, at 58.  
 43. See NELSON, supra note 37, at 58.  
 44. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 35, at 55. The 
investigation found that forty-nine civilian women, twenty-one Navy women, six 
female government employees, six female military spouses, five Navy men, two 
Marine Corps men, and one Air Force woman were all assaulted during the 
convention weekend. See id.  
 45. See Mission & History, SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION & RESPONSE OFF., 
www.sapr.mil/index.php/about/mission-and-history [https://perma.cc/MQ75-
SGZW] (last visited Nov. 26, 2018) (explaining the history of the SAPRO office).  
 46. See id. The Army calls its sexual assault prevention program the Sexual 
Harassment/Assault Response & Prevention Program (SHARP), while the Coast 
Guard, National Guard, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force have all named their 
programs the Sexual Assault Prevention & Response Program (SAPR). See id. 
994 Michigan State Law Review  2018 
the oversight of the DOD sexual assault policy.47 SAPRO provides 
resources and information about sexual assault statistics in the 
military, options for survivors of military sexual assault, and public 
information about DOD sexual assault policy.48 SAPRO works hand 
in hand with the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) to further 
the goal of military law.49 The SAPRO program oversees rape, sexual 
assault, aggravated sexual conduct, abusive sexual contact, and 
nonconsensual sodomy.50 Though a benefit to the military, there has 
been criticism that SAPRO promotes a culture of victim blaming.51 
B. Reporting Sexual Assault in the Military  
Under SAPRO, when military sexual assault is investigated, the 
investigation is contained within the “island” of the United States 
military.52 This island comes with specialized reporting options and 
investigation processes that differ from nonmilitary investigations.53 
These differences can be problematic because of the reliance on 
untrained military command to decide whether investigations will 
                                                   
 47. See id. One of its purposes is to work together with the Armed Services 
and the civilian community to develop and implement sexual assault response and 
prevention programs. See SAPRO Homepage, SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION & 
RESPONSE OFF., http://sapr.mil/index.php [https://perma.cc/S5ZG-3DT4] (last visited 
Nov. 26, 2018). 
 48. See About SAPRO, SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION & RESPONSE OFF., 
http://sapr.mil/index.php/about [https://perma.cc/57F6-G9EL] (last visited Nov. 26, 
2018). These program initiatives, reports, and public policies can be found on the 
SAPRO homepage. See id.  
 49. See SAPR & The Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), SEXUAL 
ASSAULT PREVENTION & RESPONSE OFF., http://sapr.mil/index.php/policy/sapr-the-
ucmj [https://perma.cc/6LXY-L2Q5] (last visited Nov. 26, 2018). “The [UCMJ] 
manual states that the purpose of military law is ‘to promote justice, to assist in 
maintaining good order and discipline in the armed forces, to promote efficiency and 
effectiveness in the military establishment, and thereby to strengthen the national 
security of the United States.’” Id.  
 50. See id. The SAPR program excludes intimate partner sexual assault and 
child sexual assaults, sexual harassment, and Military Sexual Trauma (MST), a term 
that refers to trauma from sexual assault and sexual harassment. See id.  
 51. See THE INVISIBLE WAR, supra note 34 (explaining that some of the 
SAPRO programming makes survivors feel as if the assault that took place was their 
fault). 
 52. See Woods, supra note 21, at 1349-50. “This judicial deference, coupled 
with the military’s legal system positioned as an island within America’s civil legal 
and social framework, together form much of the barrier to justice faced by military 
victims.” Id.  
 53. See Reporting Options, SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION & RESPONSE OFF., 
http://www.sapr.mil/index.php/reporting-options [https://perma.cc/A47J-44QR] (last 
visited Nov. 26, 2018) (listing various reporting options and investigative processes). 
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proceed.54 Due to these problems, Congress has attempted to 
promulgate legislation aimed at addressing the concerns raised by 
sexual assault survivors and available reporting data.55  
1. Reporting Issues: The Chain of Command  
Each year, the DOD releases a report on sexual assault statistics, 
prevention program initiative progress, and general information 
regarding sexual assault within the military.56 In 2016, the DOD 
reported approximately 14,900 incidents of sexual assault.57 This 
number is an estimated total of service members who indicated that 
they experienced some form of sexual assault during the year.58 Of the 
approximately 14,900 survivors, 5,350 filed reports with the DOD.59 
Procedurally, when survivors of sexual assault report their 
assault, they have two options: restricted reporting and unrestricted 
reporting.60 Restricted reporting is an option for adult survivors who 
want to confidentially report the crime without triggering an official 
investigation process or notifying command.61 The details of the crime 
do not extend past the survivor, the Sexual Assault Response 
Coordinator (SARC), the SAPR Victim Advocate (VA), and the 
doctors and nurses.62 Unrestricted reporting is recommended to adult 
survivors who want to pursue an investigation into their assault.63 In 
                                                   
 54. See Military Justice Improvement Act of 2014, S. 992, 113th Cong. 
(2014) (detailing a bill introduced by Senator Kristin Gillibrand to address the issue 
of reporting sexual assault in the military). 
 55. See id. 
 56. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 16 (examining the number 
of reported and approximated sexual assaults in fiscal year 2016).  
 57. Id. at 12. This number represents an estimate of the number of sexual 
assaults that took place that year, with 68% unreported and 32% reported cases. Id.  
 58. See id. at 38 n.i (“Based on a constructed 95 percent confidence interval 
ranging from 14,000 to 15,700, an estimated total of 14,900 DOD active duty 
members indicated experiencing a sexual assault in the past 12 months.”). 
 59. Id. at 8. 
 60. See Reporting Options, supra note 53. 
 61. See id. 
 62. See Restricted Reporting, SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION & RESPONSE 
OFF., http://www.sapr.mil/index.php/restricted-reporting [https://perma.cc/G642-
N3ST] (last visited Nov. 26, 2018). If a survivor follows a restricted reporting option, 
they may change the status to unrestricted at any time with the caveat that certain 
evidence will be lost. See id.  
 63. See Unrestricted Reporting, SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION & RESPONSE 
OFF., http://www.sapr.mil/index.php/unrestricted-reporting [https://perma.cc/L4XR-
H7SX] (last visited Nov. 26, 2018). The SAPRO website provides information on 
unrestricted reporting by explaining what unrestricted reporting is, what the 
investigation process is, considerations a service member should keep in mind when 
996 Michigan State Law Review  2018 
unrestricted reporting, the details of the assault not only reach the 
survivor, the military health professional, and the specific military 
personnel, but they also reach up the survivor’s chain of command, 
which has the discretion to investigate the crime.64 
When a survivor decides to file an unrestricted report on his or 
her sexual assault, the investigation process begins.65 The process, 
which can be frustrating and stressful, may take many months to 
conclude.66 Survivors are usually interviewed soon after the assault 
takes place in order to gather crucial details about the crime that may 
fade as time passes.67 In the current system, the commanding officer 
holds the discretion in pursuing a sexual assault case.68 This discretion 
often leads to a decrease in survivor reporting because, rather than 
having their disciplinary decisions called into question, commanding 
officers have significant incentives to dismiss claims.69 The criticisms 
of the current system have been so far-reaching that it has caught the 
                                                   
deciding whether unrestricted reporting is the best decision, and an example of the 
unrestricted reporting process for a service member. See id.  
 64. See id. With an unrestricted reporting option, survivors can report their 
assault through a variety of different avenues. See id. These avenues include: reporting 
to law enforcement who will then initiate an investigation and begin a “report of 
investigation”; reporting to their commander who will immediately contact the MCIO 
and begin a “report of investigation”; reporting to the SARC who will file a “DD Form 
2910” where the survivor will choose their reporting option; reporting to a SAPR VA 
who will also file a “DD Form 2910”; or reporting to a health care provider who will 
contact the SARC to fill out the “DD Form 2910.” Id. 
 65. See id.  
 66. See id. “The nature of the investigative process can be stressful for 
victims of sexual assault despite the sincere efforts of law enforcement, staff judge 
advocates and other personnel entrusted with holding offenders appropriately 
accountable.” Id.  
 67. See id. This quick interview process, which includes probing and 
triggering questions about the incident, can often be uncomfortable for survivors who 
have not fully processed their assaults. See id.  
 68. See Woods, supra note 21, at 1350 (explaining that commanding officers 
hold a lot of power in deciding whether a case should be pursued and some 
extenuating circumstances, like one’s reputation, may lead to dismissing legitimate 
claims). 
 69. See id. Commanding officers often participate in victim blaming tactics 
to dismiss the credibility of the survivor in order to prevent viable claims to proceed 
through the justice system. See id. 
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attention of the public70 and has prompted legislative proposals from 
United States senators.71  
2. Legislation 
In 2013, United States Senator Kristen Gillibrand introduced a 
bill that would restructure how sexual assaults were handled within 
the military, titled the Military Justice Improvement Act (MJIA).72 
More specifically, the MJIA would amend the UCMJ to state that the 
Secretaries of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security 
must require the secretaries of the military departments to modify the 
process of determining whether to try, by court martial, a service 
member accused of: (1) certain UCMJ offenses for which the 
maximum punishment is more than one year in prison; (2) conspiracy, 
solicitation, or an attempt to commit such offenses; or (3) retaliation 
or obstruction of justice regardless of the maximum punishment for 
that offense.73 Currently, decisions to initiate court-martial 
proceedings are at the discretion of the accused’s chain of command; 
however, Senator Gillibrand’s legislation would require that these 
determinations be made by a commissioned officer outside of the 
chain of command who could also serve as trial counsel.74  
The legislation recognizes that the survivor’s assailant is often 
someone within his or her own chain of command, which makes 
reporting difficult.75 The MJIA removes the systemic fear service 
members face when reporting their sexual assaults.76 The MJIA would 
move the decision to prosecute serious crimes to independent military 
prosecutors, leaving uniquely military crimes within the chain of 
command.77 Additionally, various national veteran organizations have 
                                                   
 70. See Robert Draper, The Military’s Rough Justice on Sexual Assault, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 26, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/30/magazine/the-
militarys-rough-justice-on-sexual-assault.html [https://perma.cc/92QK-JQLE] 
(explaining that the reversal of sexual assault charges by the perpetrator’s 
commanding officer resulted in outrage from the civilian world).  
 71. See Military Justice Improvement Act, KIRSTEN GILLIBRAND, 
www.gillibrand.senate.gov/mjia [https://perma.cc/VEC4-VZKL] (last visited Nov. 
26, 2018). 
 72. See id.  
 73. See Military Justice Improvement Act of 2014, S. 2992, 113th Cong. 
(2014).  
 74. See id.  
 75. See Military Justice Improvement Act, supra note 71. 
 76. See id. 
 77. See id. The crimes left within the chain of command would include thirty-
seven serious crimes uniquely military in nature, and all crimes punishable by less 
than one year in prison. See id.  
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supported the MJIA.78 On November 16, 2017, Senator Gillibrand 
reintroduced the Military Justice Improvement Act of 2017 in the 
Senate, where it was read twice and referred to the Committee on 
Armed Services.79 Legislation like the MJIA is important because 
service members are not afforded the same remedy avenues available 
to civilians.80 For years, the United States government enjoyed 
unfettered sovereign immunity, which came to an end in 1946.81 
Although legislation has passed removing much of the immunity once 
enjoyed by the United States government, the immunity has not been 
completely extinguished.82 
C. The Federal Tort Claims Act 
The FTCA states that the United States is liable to the same 
extent as a private individual or tortfeasor under like circumstances.83 
Congress passed the legislation in 1946, and it gained public attention 
following the 1945 B-25 plane crash into the Empire State Building.84 
Congress had a variety of reasons for enacting the FTCA, chief among 
them being the desire to transfer responsibility for deciding tort claims 
from Congress to the courts.85 Additionally, Congress recognized the 
                                                   
 78. See id. The MJIA was endorsed by Iraq & Afghanistan Veterans of 
America (IAVA), Vietnam Veterans of America (VVA), Service Women’s Action 
Network (SWAN), National Women’s Law Center (NWLC), Protect Our Defenders, 
and the National Task Force to End Sexual and Domestic Violence Against Women. 
See id. 
 79. See Military Justice Improvement Act of 2017, S. 2141, 115th Cong. 
(2017). 
 80. See JAYSON & LONGSTRETH, supra note 19, § 5A.02 (explaining the legal 
barriers military service members face because of their status as military personnel).  
 81. See Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, 60 Stat. 812 (1946) (defined 
as an Act “[t]o provide for increased efficiency in the legislative branch of the 
Government”). 
 82. See JAYSON & LONGSTRETH, supra note 19, § 5A.02 (noting that the 
Supreme Court has determined that “incident to service” bars all claims brought by a 
service member against the government and there should not be a case-by-case inquiry 
into whether judicial review would in fact interfere with how the military operates).  
 83. See JEROME H. NATES ET AL., DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS § 46.01 
(Matthew Bender ed., 2018).  
 84. See Joe Richman, The Day a Bomber Hit the Empire State Building, NPR 
(July 28, 2008, 11:23AM), www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId= 
92987873 [https://perma.cc/DR3X-59UA]. At the end of World War II, a bomber was 
flying a routine transportation mission to LaGuardia Airport during a foggy day. See 
id. Due to nearly zero visibility, the pilot crashed into the side of the Empire State 
Building, killing himself and thirteen others. See id. Eight months after the crash, 
families of some of the victims sued the government. See id.  
 85. See Paul F. Figley, Understanding the Federal Tort Claims Act: A 
Different Metaphor, 44 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 1105, 1107 (2009). Additional 
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issue Americans faced by having the government retain absolute 
sovereign immunity.86 Sovereign immunity requires the sovereign 
state to consent to being sued, and prior to the Act’s enactment, 
citizens could not sue the government for tortious injuries.87 Congress 
sought to remedy this prior to passing the FTCA; however, each piece 
of legislation that passed either explicitly or implicitly excluded tort 
claims.88 As the number of claims increased, Congress no longer 
wanted to spend exceeding amounts of manpower and time on the 
issue.89 So on August 2, 1946, Congress passed the FTCA after 
reviewing over thirty bills on the matter.90  
The various sections of the Act outline who is considered a 
member of the government for purposes of application,91 the liability 
parallels between the government and private individuals,92 and the 
areas excluded from the Act.93 While the FTCA extinguishes the 
government’s former absolute sovereign immunity, the government 
has retained small pockets of immunity through the various exclusions 
contained in the Act.94 Most notably, the Act excludes eleven 
intentional torts.95 As it pertains to military service members, the Act 
explicitly excludes claims arising out of combatant activities during 
times of war.96  
Although the FTCA does not include provisions that expressly 
preclude a service member from bringing a claim against the United 
States, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Act to exclude the 
                                                   
reasons for passing the legislation include acting as an administrative procedure that 
resolves the majority of tort claims against the government without litigation and 
granting the federal courts subject matter jurisdiction over the claims, pursuant to 
limitations set by Congress. See id.  
 86. See id. (“Before Congress enacted an applicable waiver of sovereign 
immunity, Americans injured by torts of the federal government could not sue it for 
damages.”). 
 87. See id. 
 88. See id. at 1107-09 (explaining the various pieces of the legislation 
Congress passed, each having different remedies for a wide range of claims). 
 89. See id. at 1109 (detailing that as the number of claims increased, 
resolving them become more laborious). 
 90. See id. The Act was a part of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946. 
See id. 
 91. See 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (1948) (defining “federal agency,” “employee of 
the government,” and “acting within the scope of his office or employment”). 
 92. See § 2674. 
 93. See § 2680. 
 94. See id.  
 95. See Figley, supra note 85, at 1127. Assault, battery, false imprisonment, 
false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of power, libel, slander, misrepresentation, 
deceit, and interference with contract rights are all excluded under the Act. See § 
2680(h). 
 96. See § 2680(j). 
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majority of service member claims.97 Derived from § 2680(j) of the 
Act, which expressly excludes claims brought by service members 
whose claims arise out of combatant activities during time of war, the 
Court has determined that recovery depends on whether the injury 
relates to the service member’s military service.98 This interpretation 
is embodied in the Feres Doctrine.99 While the FTCA has exposed the 
government and the military to liability, and, while Congress has 
sought to change the way the military handles sexual assault, survivors 
are still stymied from receiving justice because of the Doctrine.100 
II. THE FERES DOCTRINE 
While the FTCA allows the United States to be held liable to the 
same extent as a private individual, the Feres Doctrine holds that the 
Government is not liable for injuries to service members when they 
arise from activities incident to service.101 Because the Court has 
created such an ambiguous interpretation of the FTCA military 
exclusion through its Feres holding, lower courts have had to create 
their own tests for the meaning of “incident to service.”102 However, 
the people who ultimately suffer from the courts’ interpretations of 
“incident to service” are service members who are raped and sexually 
assaulted during their military careers.103  
A. Two Roads to Two Realities 
A service member’s possibility of recovery turns on the phrase 
“incident to service,” essentially making two avenues for courts to 
follow in their decision making: the Brooks rationale and the Feres 
                                                   
 97. See JAYSON & LONGSTRETH, supra note 19, § 5A.01 (“[T]he fact that the 
claimant was a member of the armed forces of the United States when he sustained 
injury or loss as a result of the wrongs of another federal employee, does not of itself 
preclude recovery under the Federal Tort Claims Act. . . . The Supreme Court, 
however, has construed the Act as containing both an exclusion and a limitation with 
regard to such claims.”). 
 98. See id.; see also § 2680(j). 
 99. See JAYSON & LONGSTRETH, supra note 19, § 5A.01 
 100. See generally id. (explaining that because of the Feres Doctrine, many 
service member claims against the military are dismissed).  
 101. See Figley, supra note 85, at 1116. “[T]he Government is not liable under 
the [FTCA] for injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the 
course of activity incident to service.” Id. (quoting Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 
135, 141 (1950)). 
 102. See JAYSON & LONGSTRETH, supra note 19 (explaining that when an 
injury is incident to service, the civilian court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over 
the claim).  
 103. See Doe v. Hagenbeck, 870 F.3d 36, 39 (2d Cir. 2017). 
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rationale.104 When a court determines that a claim falls too far outside 
the scope of military service, the service member is permitted to bring 
a claim: a Brooks rationale.105 However, if the claim falls under the 
mantle of “incident to service,” that service member is barred from 
bringing a claim: a Feres rationale.106 
1. Brooks v. United States 
When a court rules that an injury occurred outside the scope of 
a service member’s military service, the court applies the decision in 
Brooks v. United States and allows the case to proceed.107 In February 
1945, Arthur Brooks, a service member, was killed while driving off-
duty and off-base when a civilian Army employee driving a United 
States Army truck struck his car.108 The Court found that the Act gave 
district courts subject matter jurisdiction over any claim founded in 
negligence and brought against the United States.109 The Court did not 
believe that any claim meant “any claim but that [brought by] 
servicemen.”110 In fact, the legislation current at the time did not 
include that absolute exclusion.111 
The government argued that if the Court allowed service 
members to sue it, the consequences would hinder the discipline and 
order needed to operate the armed forces.112 The Court, however, 
reiterated that the language of the FTCA  and the specific facts of the 
case did not support the government’s argument.113 It stated that the 
case resulted from an injury sustained outside of Brooks’s military 
service.114 Had the facts illustrated that his injuries were connected to 
                                                   
 104. See JAYSON & LONGSTRETH, supra note 19. 
 105. See id.  
 106. See id.  
 107. See id. 
 108. See Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 50 (1949). 
 109. See id. at 51. 
 110. Id. Further, the Court acknowledged that eighteen tort claims bills were 
introduced in Congress between 1925 and 1935, and all but two bills contained 
explicit exceptions denying recovery to service members. See id.  
 111. See id. at 52 (explaining that the passed Act included only an exclusion 
of claims for which the World War Veterans’ Act of 1924 provided compensation). 
 112. See id. at 52-53. The Government cited incidents like a commander’s 
poor judgment during battle, defective military equipment, and a military surgeon’s 
medical malpractice incidents as grounding the United States in tort actions. See id.  
 113. See id. “The Government’s fears may have point in reflecting 
congressional purpose to leave injuries incident to service where they were, despite 
literal language and other considerations to the contrary.” Id.  
 114. See id. (concluding that the facts presented explained that the injury had 
nothing to do with Brooks’ service, and the connection between the injury and his 
service was too attenuated).  
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his service, the Court would have reached a different result.115 The 
antithesis of Brooks is the Supreme Court’s decision and analysis in 
Feres v. United States.116 
2. Feres v. United States 
Consolidating three cases with similar facts,117 the Supreme 
Court looked at whether the FTCA extends to injuries sustained 
“incident to service.”118 The Court further clarified that Feres was a 
“wholly different case” than Brooks.119 While already established in 
the Act itself and in Brooks, the Court reconfirmed that the Act 
contemplates actions brought against the government for the 
negligence of military personnel.120 The Court, however, believed that 
in its language, the Act is ambiguous in deciding when a service 
member’s claim may be successfully brought against the 
government.121 Nonetheless, the Court proceeded to give three reasons 
for why the unique relationship between a service member and the 
armed services renders application of the FTCA impracticable.122 
First, the Court stated that no claim brought by a service member 
against the government could parallel a private cause of action—a 
requirement of the FTCA.123 The Court knew of no American law that 
allowed a service member to recover damages for negligence from a 
                                                   
 115. See id. at 52 
 116. See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950). 
 117. See id. at 138. The Feres case involved the decedent perishing in a fire 
caused by a faulty heating system in the Pine Camps barracks, the Jefferson case 
involved the plaintiff suing the United States Government for medical malpractice 
after a surgeon left a towel inside of his wound after surgery, and the Griggs case 
involved an executrix suing the government after a surgery performed by unskilled 
surgeons resulted in the decedent’s death. See id. at 136-37. 
 118. See id. at 138. 
 119. See id.  
 120. See id. at 138.  
 121. See id. at 138-39. (“We also are reminded that the Brooks case, in spite 
of its reservation of service-connected injuries, interprets the Act to cover claims not 
incidental to service, and it is argued that much of its reasoning is as apt to impose 
liability in favor of a man on duty as in favor of one on leave. These considerations, 
it is said, should persuade us to cast upon Congress, as author of the confusion, the 
task of qualifying and clarifying its language if the liability here asserted should prove 
so depleting of the public treasury as the Government fears.”). 
 122. See Michael Rust, Comment, Expansion of the Feres Doctrine, 32 
EMORY L.J. 237, 240-41 (1983) (stating that there are four rationales for the Feres 
Doctrine, three of which are cited in the Feres case opinion). 
 123. See id. at 241; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1948); Feres v. United States, 
340 U.S. 135, 141 (1950).  
 Who’s Got Your Six? 1003 
superior officer or the Government.124 The Court acknowledged that 
parallels could be found if the statuses of the parties were stripped, 
leaving only the specific circumstances of the injury.125 However, it 
held that the Act does not create new liabilities, and stripping the 
statuses would create “novel and unprecedented liabilities.”126 
Next, the Court looked at the FTCA requirement that the 
applicable law of each FTCA suit shall be the law of the place where 
the incident occurred.127 The Court explained that since a service 
member is required to serve in multiple locations at any given time, 
the location of the injury would determine the law to be followed, and 
that distinction would make little sense.128 Noting that different states 
have varying provisions regarding limitations of liability, assumption 
of the risk, comparative negligence, and more, the Court assumed that 
it would be irrational to leave service members dependent upon rules 
of law over which they have no control.129  
Third, the Court reasoned that service members were entitled to 
recover through other avenues, and it was not clear whether Congress 
intended for the Act to be interpreted to provide for multiple types of 
remedies for the same action.130 Additionally, the Court stated that 
since service members are at a disadvantage in litigation due to lack 
of time and resources, relying on the already-established remedies 
would be more beneficial to them.131 Ultimately, the Court decided that 
                                                   
 124. See Feres, 340 U.S at 141. Additionally, the Court states that a private 
individual does not have the power to command or mobilize a private army with the 
authority similar to that of the Government over the armed forces. See id. at 141-42. 
 125. See id. at 142. 
 126. See id. 
 127. See id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (“It is not without significance as to 
whether the Act should be construed to apply to service-connected injuries that it 
makes ‘. . . the law of the place where the act or omission occurred’ govern any 
consequent liability.”)). 
 128. See id. at 143.  
 129. See id. Since a soldier could be stationed in over forty-eight states, the 
Panama Canal, Alaska, and Hawaii, the Court reasoned that it would be best if a 
soldier did not have to worry about what laws would be applicable in their exact case. 
See id. 
 130. See id. at 144. The Court contemplated multiple ways to address the 
multiple compensation avenues through options like allowing the service member to: 
“[1] enjoy both types of recovery, or [2] elect which to pursue, thereby waiving the 
other, or [3] pursue both, crediting the larger liability with the proceeds of the smaller, 
or [4] [] [none of the options mentioned because] the compensation and pension 
remedy excludes the tort remedy.” Id.  
 131. See id. at 145 (adding that already established compensation systems do 
not require litigation for recovery). 
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it would be best if the service members were restricted from bringing 
a claim all together.132 
In its conclusion, the Court distinguished Feres from Brooks.133 
While Brooks was on furlough, driving on a highway, and under no 
military or mission related orders when an Army truck hit his car, the 
service members in Feres sustained their injuries while on active duty 
and under the military’s supervision.134 Their injuries were thus 
sustained incident to their service, therefore precluding them from 
recovering under the FTCA.135 
B. “Incident to Service” 
The distinction between Brooks and Feres turns on the meaning 
of “incident to service.”136 Although the phrase does not appear 
anywhere in the FTCA, it did appear in the Military Personnel Claims 
Act (MPCA), a piece of legislation superseded by the FTCA.137 The 
actual language of the FTCA, instead, excludes any claim that arises 
out of “combatant activities . . . during time of war.”138 In its Feres 
decision, the Court developed the terminology of “incident to service” 
without actually creating a test to define it.139 However, the Court has 
broadened the Feres rationale to bar claims that require civilian courts 
to second-guess military decisions.140 
In Shearer v. United States, the Court held that the decedent’s 
estate could not bring a negligence suit against the United States 
because doing so would be an improper judicial intrusion by a civilian 
court.141 While off-duty and away from base, Private Vernon Shearer 
was kidnapped and murdered by Private Andrew Heard.142 The 
decedent’s administrator alleged that the Army knew Private Heard 
was a danger to the public but failed to reasonably control him and 
                                                   
 132. See id.  
 133. See id. at 146.  
 134. See id. The Court emphasized that the two cases were different because 
Brooks was not under compulsion of orders or duty and was not on a military mission. 
See id.  
 135. See id.  
 136. See JAYSON & LONGSTRETH, supra note 19 (explaining that this 
distinction is a question of fact). 
 137. See id. 
 138. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j) (1948). 
 139. See Cioca v. Rumsfeld, 720 F.3d 505, 512 (4th Cir. 2013). The incident 
to service principle “cannot be reduced to a few bright line rules.” Id. (quoting United 
States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 57 (1985)). 
 140. See Shearer, 473 U.S. at 57. 
 141. See id. at 57-59. 
 142. See id. at 53. 
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failed to warn others of his release from German prison.143 The Court 
of Appeals for the Third Circuit had considered the fact that Private 
Shearer was off-duty and off base when he was murdered, analogizing 
the facts to the Court’s decision in Brooks.144 But in its ultimate 
decision, the Supreme Court held that where the injury took place is 
far less important than whether the suit would require civilian courts 
to second-guess military decisions.145 This second-guessing would 
essentially impair military discipline.146  
Decisions like Shearer, which focus on the fear of decreased 
military discipline and efficiency, have only led to more confusion as 
to what the standard for “incident to service” is.147 With the focus on 
military discipline so prevalent, the courts do not really know how to 
rule.148 Because of the Supreme Court’s inability to define “incident to 
service,” lower courts have taken it upon themselves to apply their 
own rules to the ambiguous analysis.149 While some elements 
considered in the analysis are similar among the circuits, how the 
circuits specifically approach these elements differs.150 However, these 
different approaches have key elements that could, in combination, 
lead to a better application of the Feres Doctrine.151 
                                                   
 143. Id. at 54. Prior to the murder, Pvt. Heard had been released from a 
German prison having served a four-year sentence for manslaughter while stationed 
at an Army base in Germany. See id. 
 144. See id. at 58. 
 145. See id. at 57. 
 146. See id at 58. “To permit this type of suit would mean that commanding 
officers would have to stand prepared to convince a civilian court of the wisdom of a 
wide range of military and disciplinary decisions; for example, whether to overlook a 
particular incident or episode, whether to discharge a serviceman, and whether and 
how to place restraints on a soldier’s off-base conduct.” Id.  
 147. See JAYSON & LONGSTRETH, supra note 19 (explaining that since there 
are no bright line rules for deciding what is “incident to service” the lower courts have 
been left to create their own tests).  
 148. See id. (examining the pattern of the Supreme Court stating that the 
primary consideration is civilian interference in military decision-making and the 
lower courts rejecting a case-by-case analysis of that standard).  
 149. See id. (explaining that most courts have approached the “incident to 
service” conundrum by adopting multi-factor tests).  
 150. See id. The Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals have all 
adopted their own multi-prong tests for the issue. See id.  
 151. See generally Adams v. United States, 728 F.2d 736 (5th Cir. 1984); see 
also Costo v. United States, 248 F.3d 863, 867-69 (9th Cir. 2001); Brown v. United 
States, 739 F.2d 362, 366-68 (8th Cir. 1984). 
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1. The Fifth Circuit: Adams v. United States  
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit decided that multiple 
factors needed to be considered when deciding the applicability of the 
Feres Doctrine in Adams v. United States.152 Robert Oatis, a former 
service member, died after suffering a heart attack during a 
circumcision procedure performed by military surgeons.153 After the 
surgery, the hospital reached out to the Army to request information 
on the decedent’s military status, which the Army described as 
“indefinite excess leave.”154 The court relied on the test it created in 
Parker v. United States to determine whether the injuries in Adams 
fell under the Feres Doctrine analysis.155 The three-part test required 
the court to analyze: (1) the duty status of the service member; (2) the 
place where the injury occurred; and (3) the activity of the service 
member at the time of the injury.156 The court noted that while no 
single factor is dispositive, the duty status of the service member has 
been the most indicative of the relationship between the service 
member and the government at the time of the injury.157 The court held 
that duty status was to be viewed as a spectrum with actual active duty 
and discharge at the two extremes.158 Thus, it held that since the Army 
did all that it could to sever the status ties between itself and the 
decedent, the duty status of the decedent did not fall within the scope 
of the Feres standard.159 The court held that the Feres standard did not 
apply because holding that the Army’s actions were not equivalent to 
a discharge would be tantamount to holding that any former service 
member could refuse to complete part of the discharge process and 
reap the benefits of the military for the rest of his or her life.160 
                                                   
 152. See Adams, 728 F.2d at 738-39.  
 153. See id. at 737. Oatis’ survivors, Debra Adams and Bernita Holmes, 
brought this claim. See id.; see also Isabel Teotonio, Why Adult Men Are Getting 
Circumcised, STAR (Jan. 9, 2012), https://www.thestar.com/life/2012/01/09/ 
why_adult_men_are_getting_circumcised.html [https://perma.cc/4WD6-PYWY] 
(explaining that adult men are circumcised for a variety of reasons including: religious 
identification, improved hygiene, sexual performance, and aesthetics).  
 154. See Adams, 728 F.2d at 738. The decedent had been court-martialed and 
released from the Army after being found in possession of drugs. See id. at 737.  
 155. See id. at 738 (referencing Parker v. United States, 611 F.2d 1007 (5th 
Cir. 1980)). 
 156. See id. at 739. 
 157. See id.  
 158. See id.   
 159. See id. 
 160. See id. at 739-40. The court noted that the Army discharged Oatis to the 
best of their ability, and it was Oatis’ responsibility to report to Fort Polk to complete 
the remaining paperwork. See id. at 739.  
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2. The Eighth Circuit: Brown v. United States 
In Brown v. United States, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit created a two-part test to determine the applicability of the 
Feres Doctrine.161 The victim’s mother brought suit against the 
military under the FTCA for injuries her son sustained during a 
racially motivated hanging.162 The Eighth Circuit’s two-part Feres 
analysis asked whether there was a relevant relationship between the 
service member’s activity at the time of the act and his or her military 
service and whether the action heard through civil litigation would 
impede military discipline.163 
To determine whether a relevant relationship existed between a 
service member’s activity and his or her military service, the court 
looked at three prominent rationales previously deemed important: (1) 
the duty status of the service member; (2) the location where the injury 
occurred; and (3) the nature of the activity.164 Applying the specific 
facts of the case,165 the court reasoned that the duty status of the service 
member is not a strong enough indicator that military immunity should 
be applied.166 For the second rationale, the court recognized that some 
courts hold the location of the injury as a per se bar to recover under 
Feres.167 The court, however, held that while that rationale must be 
considered, it alone is not dispositive.168 Lastly, in determining the 
relevance of the nature of the activity, the court inquired into the actual 
activity at the time of the injury.169 The court held that it must consider 
whether the activity out of which the injury occurred served some 
military purpose.170  
Having decided that the facts of Brown did not demonstrate a 
relevant relationship between the service member’s activity and his 
                                                   
 161. See Brown v. United States, 739 F.2d 362, 367 (8th Cir. 1984). 
 162. See id. at 362. 
 163. See id. at 367. 
 164. See id.  
 165. See id. When the incident occurred, the victim was off-duty for Memorial 
Day weekend with no training activities planned, and the victim was free to leave the 
base if he pleased. See id. Therefore, the court reasoned that even though the victim 
was not officially on furlough, the facts were not strong enough to apply Feres to this 
specific rationale. See id.  
 166. See Brown, 739 F.2d at 367.  
 167. See id. “The location of the injury has been considered significantly by 
many courts under the incident to service test. Indeed, one court has observed that it 
appears ‘fairly well established’ that if the injury occurs on a military base, recovery 
is automatically barred under Feres.” Id.  
 168. See id. at 368.  
 169. See id.  
 170. See id. The court understood that the racially motivated hanging served 
no conceivable military purpose or mission. See id. 
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military service, the court then focused on the second part of the 
analysis: effects of military discipline.171 The court placed the claims 
brought against the military into three categories and analyzed 
whether litigation would call into question the military’s decision-
making.172 Because the litigation against the superior officers would 
call into question their specific disciplinary decisions, the court held 
that the Feres Doctrine barred the claims against the superior 
officers.173  
3. The Ninth Circuit: Costo v. United States 
In determining whether a specific case falls within the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of Feres, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit adopted a four-factor test.174 On July 1, 1995, during a rafting 
trip sponsored by the United States Navy, Navy sailors Nollie Costo 
and Christopher Graham drowned after getting trapped when their raft 
tipped over in turbulent water.175 The sailors’ estates brought a claim 
against the Navy for negligence, alleging that the military breached its 
duty of care to the decedents.176 The court recognized that previous 
courts avoided prescribing a standard for applying any particular 
rationales to the Feres Doctrine, but the court decided to adopt a four-
factor test.177 The four factors the court established in Costo were:  
1) the place where the negligent act occurred; 2) the duty status of the 
plaintiff when the negligent act occurred; 3) the benefits accruing to the 
plaintiff because of his status as a service member; and 4) the nature of the 
plaintiff’s activities at the time the negligent act occurred.178  
                                                   
 171. See id. at 368. 
 172. See id. at 369. The three categories were: (1) failure to prevent the 
incident; (2) participation of certain defendants in the actual hanging incident; and (3) 
failure to perform a proper investigation into the incident. See id.  
 173. See id. The claims against the specific perpetrators, however, were 
permitted to continue. See id.  
 174. See JAYSON & LONGSTRETH, supra note 19.  
 175. See Costo v. United States, 248 F.3d 863, 865 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 176. See id. (noting that the estates alleged the duty was breached due to the 
military’s failure to obtain a rafting permit, hire a trained guide, and properly 
supervise those guides). The estate further alleged that the military failed to properly 
scout the river, warn the rafters of the river’s condition, properly equip the rafts, 
instruct the rafters, rescue the rafters, and administer lifesaving aid. See id.  
 177. See id. at 867. 
 178. Id.  
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In creating the four-factor analysis, the Ninth Circuit stressed that no 
one factor is dispositive.179 Although the court ultimately held that the 
Feres Doctrine must be applied to the case, it did so reluctantly, 
admitting a frustration shared with other courts that have reached 
similar determinations.180 Although a frustrating concept for courts, 
the Feres Doctrine has been applied to bar claims stemming from 
sexual assault against the United States military on numerous 
occasions.181  
C. Sexual Assault and “Incident to Service”: Doe v. Hagenbeck 
Survivors of military sexual assault are not exempt from the 
incident to service standard of the Feres Doctrine.182 As the prospect 
of receiving justice through the military justice system decreases, 
survivors seek remedies against their assailants in civilian courts.183 
However, Feres acts as an obstacle that is very difficult to overcome.184 
In Doe v. Hagenbeck, Doe brought a claim against her superior 
officers, Lieutenant General Hagenbeck and Brigadier General Rapp, 
for a culture that persisted under their control that resulted in her 
assault.185 Doe sought to hold these officers personally liable for 
damages in connection with their decisions regarding the training and 
                                                   
 179. See id. (“[N]one of these factors [are] dispositive. Rather than seizing on 
any particular combination of factors, we have focused on ‘the totality of the 
circumstances.’”). 
 180. See id. at 869. (“[W]e apply the Feres doctrine here without relish. Nor 
are we the first to reluctantly reach such a conclusion under the doctrine. Rather, in 
determining this suit to be barred, we join the many panels of this Court that have 
criticized the inequitable extension of this doctrine to a range of situations that seem 
far removed from the doctrine’s original purposes.”). Id. 
 181. See Cioca v. Rumsfeld, 720 F.3d 505, 506, 518 (4th Cir. 2013) (holding 
that Feres counsels “judicial abstention”); see also Klay v. Panetta, 758 F.3d 369, 374 
(D.C. Cir. 2014) (holding that Feres bars plaintiff’s Bivens claim because the injury 
arose incident to service).  
 182. See Rumsfeld, 720 F.3d at 507 (holding that the survivor’s negligence 
claims against the military for fostering a culture that perpetuated sexual harassment 
that led to acts of sexual assault were barred by the Feres Doctrine). 
 183. See Woods, supra note 21, at 1331 (explaining that the survivors seek to 
hold the government accountable through the criminal and civil system). 
 184. See id. 
 185. See Doe v. Hagenbeck, 870 F.3d 36, 41 (2d Cir. 2017) (explaining that 
Doe’s equal protection claim is based on the notion that Lieutenant General 
Hagenbeck and Brigadier General Rapp “knowingly and intentionally created and 
enforced a policy and practice . . . that discriminated against female cadets [at West 
Point]” (internal quotations omitted)). Doe claims that her superior officers tolerated 
attacks against female cadets, discouraged reporting, and promoted a sexually 
aggressive culture that caused her own sexual assault. See id.  
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supervision of personnel at West Point.186 However, the court found 
that her claim could not proceed.187  
The majority opinion relied on Chappell v. Wallace and United 
States v. Stanley, Feres progenies, to justify dismissing Doe’s Bivens 
claims.188 The court noted that in Chappell,189 the Supreme Court held 
that special factors advised against the service member plaintiffs from 
maintaining Bivens claims.190 Further, the court noted that the 
Chappell Court cautions against allowing Doe’s claims because, in the 
absence of congressional action, service members could not maintain 
a suit to recover damages for alleged constitutional violations.191 
Emphasizing the barring of Doe’s Bivens claims, the court cited 
Stanley192 in explaining that there is no Bivens remedy available for 
injuries that arise incident to service, despite there being no officer–
subordinate relationship.193 Thus, relying on Supreme Court precedent, 
the court found that since Doe was a member of the military at the 
time of her injury and the claims against her superior officers 
concerned military discipline and control, the civilian court would be 
required to second-guess military decisions, triggering the incident-to-
service rule of Feres.194  
                                                   
 186. See id. at 42. Doe’s points of contention against her superior officers 
regarded their “training, supervision, discipline, education, and command of service 
personnel at West Point.” Id.  
 187. See id. In denying Doe’s Bivens claim, the court held that enlisted 
military service members cannot “maintain a suit to recover damages from a superior 
officer for alleged constitutional violations.” Id. (quoting Chappell v. Wallace, 462 
U.S. 296, 296 (9th Cir. 1983)). 
 188. See id. at 42-50. 
 189. See id. at 43 (detailing the service members’ claims against their superior 
officers for discriminating against them on the basis of race in Chappell v. Wallace, 
462 U.S. 296 (1983)). 
 190. See id. (referencing Chappell, 462 U.S. at 297, 304, and the centuries of 
military expertise that makes civilian courts ill-equipped to interfere in military 
decision making). 
 191. See id. at 44. “Congress, the Court unanimously said, has ‘plenary control 
over rights, duties, and responsibilities in the framework of the [m]ilitary 
[e]stablishment, including regulations, procedures[,] and remedies related to military 
discipline.’” Id. at 43-44 (quoting Chappell, 462 U.S. at 301). 
 192. See id. at 44. The court explained that the Supreme Court ruled that the 
former service member could not maintain a Bivens claim alleging that the Army 
secretly gave him doses of LSD to study the drug’s effect even though some of the 
defendants were not Stanley’s superior officers. See id. 
 193. See id. (referencing the holding in United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 
684 (1987)). 
 194. See id. The court relied on the Supreme Court’s caution against extending 
Bivens to situations that have “special factors counselling hesitation.” Id. at 42 
(quoting Chappell, 462 U.S. at 298).  
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Doe argued that her injuries did not arise incident to her military 
service, using the court’s decision in Taber v. Maine195 to strengthen 
her argument, but the court disagreed.196 Reflecting on its decision in 
Taber, the court stated that the question of whether the Feres doctrine 
barred the plaintiff’s FTCA claim turned on whether a person in 
Taber’s position would be entitled to compensation benefits under the 
scope-of-employment theory.197 The court further explained that the 
Taber court held that the incident-to-service rule is still properly 
invoked when the claim requires military leadership to stand trial for 
its decision-making.198  
The dissent, however, disagreed with the majority’s application 
of Taber and the overall application of Feres to this case.199 The dissent 
argued in its analysis that the harassment Doe endured was the result 
of the policies and practices the defendants implemented, encouraged, 
or allowed to proliferate.200 The opinion went on to state that the Feres 
Doctrine should not apply to this case because Doe’s injuries were not 
incident to her service.201 Ultimately, Doe’s claims against the 
defendants failed when the court once again deferred to Congress to 
remedy the issue the Supreme Court created.202 Because of the 
                                                   
 195. See id. at 47. Enlisted Seabee Scott A. Taber was injured in a car accident 
by the drunken Navy serviceman Robert S. Maine. See Taber v. Maine, 67 F.3d 1029, 
1032 (2d Cir. 1995). Taber sued Maine for negligent driving and the United States 
Government under the theory of respondeat superior because it was alleged that the 
accident occurred while Maine was acting within the scope of his Naval employment. 
See id. 
 196. See Hagenbeck, 870 F.3d at 47 (explaining that Doe’s interpretation of 
Taber is misguided). 
 197. See id. (clarifying that the Taber court concluded that the theory turns on 
whether Taber was injured while he was engaged in activities that “fell within the 
scope of his military employment”).  
 198. See id. at 48 (explaining that the Taber court understood that the Feres 
rule is invoked when a service member’s claim requires commanding officers to be 
prepared to convince a civilian court of the infinite wisdom of military discipline 
decisions). The court went on to cast upon Congress the duty of determining whether 
affording money damages to claims such as Doe’s is appropriate. See id. at 49.  
 199. See id. at 51 (Chin, J., dissenting). 
 200. See id. The dissent provides examples of the misogynistic West Point 
culture which included: creating separate curriculum requirements for male and 
female cadets with self-defense classes for women and boxing classes offered to men; 
requiring sexually transmitted disease testing for female cadets only; warning female 
cadets that it was their responsibility to dissuade sexual advances from male cadets 
while speaking openly about the male cadets’ sexual exploits and encouraging them 
to take advantage of any sexual opportunity; imposing inadequate punishments for 
sexual offenders; and permitting sexually degrading, violent, and explicit group 
chants. See id.  
 201. See id. at 51. 
 202. See id. at 50 (concluding that while not discounting the seriousness of the 
allegations, it is the Legislature’s duty to remedy this issue). 
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Supreme Court’s refusal to provide an applicable test for defining 
“incident to service,” the protectors in uniform are left without a civil 
recourse for the crimes committed against them; for this reason, the 
Feres Doctrine must be modified.  
III. THE MODIFICATION OF FERES 
Although the Feres Doctrine has a practical use in protecting the 
United States government from litigation for issues stemming from 
combat or training injuries, which is a clear purpose in the language 
of the FTCA, the way that the courts interpret the FTCA completely 
changes the way it is used in practice.203 Survivors of sexual assault 
are forced to work within a complicated and problematic system that 
does not benefit them.204 Within the military reporting system, there 
are fears that impartiality hinders the ways in which commanding 
officers do their jobs.205 However, when survivors seek to recover from 
the administrative powers that failed to prevent rape or sexual assault 
in civil courts, they are barred from bringing suit because of the Feres 
Doctrine.206 Feres is failing the service members who are harmed by 
acts that do not arise from service activities.207 For this reason, the 
current application of the doctrine must be reexamined and 
modified.208 Additionally, because Feres is a judge-made rule, it is the 
                                                   
 203. See generally Committee Hearing, supra note 26 (using the statement of 
Daniel Joseph, counsel, Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer, and Feld, LLP, in which he 
argued that § 2680(j) of the FTCA bars liability for combatant activities during time 
of war, and the Court has not respected the balance of the interests Congress created). 
 204. See generally Mark Thompson, Military Sexual Assault Victims 
Discharged after Filing Complaints, TIME (May 18, 2016), htttp://www.time.com/ 
4340321/sexual-assault-military-discharge-women/ [https://perma.cc/6CBK-YB5T] 
(detailing instances where survivors have been disciplined for filing reports of their 
sexual assaults). 
 205. See generally Jackie Speier, Why Rapists in Military Get Away with It, 
CNN (June 21, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/06/21/opinion/speier-military-
rape/index.html [https://perma.cc/8SLR-EYYQ]. 
 206. See Cioca v. Rumsfeld, 720 F.3d 505, 517-18 (4th Cir. 2013) (holding 
that the survivors’ claims were barred because their injuries occurred incident to 
service); see generally Klay v. Panetta, 758 F.3d 369 (D.C. Cir. 2014).  
 207. See Rebecca Huval, Feres Doctrine and the Obstacles to Justice for 
Military Rape Victims, PBS (May 9, 2013), www.pbs.org/independentlens/blog/feres-
doctrine-and-the-obstacles-to-justice-for-military-rape-victims/ 
[https://perma.cc/2ZVV-XE8D] (explaining that the Feres Doctrine has been 
expanded to prevent victims of rape from suing the military). 
 208. See id. “Over half a century later, Feres is not only a judicial invention, 
but, more alarmingly, the seed of an ever-increasing body of flawed doctrinal 
offspring.” Id.  
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job of the judiciary to rectify its misapplication.209 Thus, a clearer test 
that eliminates much of the ambiguity surrounding “incident to 
service” would give survivors of military sexual assault a fighting 
chance to seek and receive the justice they deserve.210  
A. A New Hope: Feres Reimagined 
For survivors of military sexual assault to receive the justice they 
deserve, the current Feres framework must be reimagined.211 Courts 
must look at the totality of the circumstances surrounding the assault 
instead of looking at the incident within the vacuum of military 
deference.212 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth and 
Eighth Circuits contributed individual factors that would make the 
Feres Doctrine focus more on the actual incident, such as the duty 
status of the service member213 and the actual activity of the service 
member when the injury occurred.214 Furthermore, in evaluating the 
actual activity of the service member, courts must analyze whether the 
activity served a military goal or purpose and whether the injury 
sustained was a foreseeable consequence of that military goal or 
purpose.215 In examining the foreseeability of military injuries, the 
Taber court analyzed the “incident to service” requirement through 
the workers’ compensation scope, creating a digestible analysis for 
defining the term.216 In a multistep analysis, courts should therefore 
                                                   
 209. See Coreen Farris, Terry L. Schell, & Terri Tenielian, Enemy Within: 
Military Sexual Assault Inflicts Physical, Psychological, Financial Pain, RAND 
CORP., https://www.rand.org/pubs/periodicals/rand-review/issues/2013/summer/ 
enemy-within.html [https://perma.cc/REB3-FBX6] (last visited Nov. 26, 2018) 
(explaining that under the current reporting system, survivors under report because of 
fear of retaliation, stigma, and lack of action).  
 210. See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950). But cf. THE 
INVISIBLE WAR, supra note 34 (explaining that under the current test, the Courts are 
outweighing the need for survivors receiving justice against the argument for military 
discipline and autonomy).  
 211. See Cioca, 720 F.3d at 514; see also Doe v. Hagenbeck, 870 F.3d 36, 44-
47 (2d Cir. 2017) (citing Feres’ incident to service analysis to bar claims of sexual 
assault brought against military leadership). 
 212. See generally Committee Hearing, supra note 26 (explaining how 
lawmakers and military leadership, past and present, are preoccupied with leaving 
decision-making to the military and ignoring the text of the legislation). 
 213. See Adams v. United States, 728 F.2d 736, 739 (5th Cir. 1984) 
(implementing the Parker test to determine the importance of duty status in a Feres 
analysis). 
 214. See Brown v. United States, 739 F.2d 362, 368 (8th Cir. 1984) (analyzing 
what the service member was actually doing when the injury occurred).  
 215. See generally Taber v. Maine, 67 F.3d 1029 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 216. See generally id. (comparing “incident to service” to employment 
rationale for workers’ compensation payments). 
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look at the duty status of the service member and the actual activity of 
the service member at the time of the injury to determine whether an 
incident, particularly sexual assault, falls under a Feres Doctrine 
incident-to-service analysis.217 
1. Duty Status of the Service Member 
In determining whether a Feres Doctrine analysis should be 
applied to a particular incident, examining the duty status of the 
service member should be the first step.218 Previous courts have 
determined that if a service member is completely discharged from the 
military, he or she is no longer under the purview of the Feres Doctrine 
analysis.219 But if he or she is an active military service member, the 
Feres Doctrine analysis must be evaluated further.220 In reality, 
however, duty status falls on a spectrum that is not always clearly 
delineated.221 Thus, similar to the court’s holding in Parker,222 which 
emphasized the duty status spectrum, the analysis should also be 
considered on a spectrum with duty statuses closer to the “active 
military” end more likely to fall under a Feres Doctrine analysis.223 
When a service member is closer to active duty on the spectrum, the 
                                                   
 217. See Adams, 728 F.2d at 739. “[D]uty status of the service member is 
usually considered the most indicative of the nature of the nexus between him and the 
government at the time of injury and is therefore the most important factor.” Id.; see 
also Cioca v. Rumsfeld, 720 F.3d 505, 514 (4th Cir. 2013). “Plaintiffs argue, however, 
that the injuries they allege did not ‘arise out of’ and were not ‘incident to’ military 
service. Specifically, they assert that ‘Defendants have not made any evidentiary 
showing that rape and sexual assault, and the resultant failures to punish the 
perpetrators, served a military mission.’” Id. 
 218. Parker v. United States, 611 F.2d 1007, 1013 (5th Cir. 1980) (analyzing 
the importance of the service member’s duty status on a Feres and FTCA analysis). 
 219. See Adams, 728 F.2d at 739 (explaining that since the service member 
was essentially discharged from the Army, his duty status would disqualify him from 
a Feres analysis).  
 220. See id. (reaffirming that duty status is the most indicative of a relationship 
between the military and a service member and should, therefore, be subject to Feres). 
 221. See 10 U.S.C. § 101(d) (1956) (defining various military duty statuses).  
 222. See generally Parker, 611 F.2d 1007 (holding that if a service member is 
discharged from the military, his activities are not likely to be “incident to service,” 
but a service member who is on active duty is most likely acting incident to his or her 
service). Specialist Five Jack Lowe Parker was killed in a car accident on an Army 
maintained road within Fort Hood. See id. at 1008. His car collided with a service 
member named Peters who at the time of the fatal accident was driving a military 
vehicle. See id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the 
district court erred in granting the government summary judgment due in part to his 
attenuated duty status at the time of the accident. See id. at 1015. 
 223. See, e.g., id. at 1014 (analyzing the victim’s four-day absence from base 
and deciding that the absence was to an extent that allowed the claim to proceed). 
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service member is under military control and supervision—
highlighting the importance of duty status.224 It logically follows that, 
since the service member is under the scrutiny of the military, it is 
more likely that Feres precludes the claim.225 
While courts have previously designated this factor as 
dispositive of the Feres Doctrine’s application, it should act merely as 
a gatekeeper to Feres cases.226 It makes little sense to decide whether 
a claim should continue or be barred primarily on the duty status of a 
service member because the distinction undercuts the right to sue the 
government as provided by the FTCA.227 Instead, the most dispositive 
factor of this two-step analysis should be the actual activity of the 
service member at the time the incident occurred.228 This analysis 
would require the court to look at the totality of the circumstances 
surrounding the incident.229 In cases involving sexual assault or rape, 
it should be clear that those injuries fall outside the scope of the Feres 
Doctrine analysis because no matter how militaristic the initial 
activity, rape should never be recognized as a foreseeable 
consequence.230 
2. The Actual Activity of the Service Member at the Time of the 
Incident  
After deciding that a service member falls under a Feres 
analysis, the court must then review the actual activity of the service 
                                                   
 224. See Downes v. United States, 249 F. Supp. 626, 628 (E.D.N.C. 1965) 
(emphasizing that “[t]he peculiar and special relationship of the soldier to his 
superiors” requires the courts to pause and carefully examine whether proceeding 
under a Feres Doctrine analysis is warranted).  
 225. See Parker, 611 F.2d at 1013. “Nevertheless in this case, a suit by one 
leaving the base to attend to his personal affairs, while under no military supervision, 
will not interfere with military discipline.” Id.  
 226. See generally Earl Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 181 (1962). “[O]ur citizens in uniform may not be stripped of basic rights 
simply because they have doffed their civilian clothes.” Id. at 188.  
 227. See Doe v. Hagenbeck, 870 F.3d 36, 56 (2d Cir. 2017) (Chin, J., 
dissenting) (describing multiple cases in which service members have successfully 
sued the U.S. government for violating constitutional rights). 
 228. See id. at 59 (explaining that Doe’s activity was so far removed from her 
military service that it should not warrant a Feres analysis). 
 229. See id. The dissent looked at what Doe was doing at the time of the injury 
in its opinion and not just her status as a cadet or the location of the alleged rape. See 
id. 
 230. See generally Zerlina Maxwell, Rape Culture Is Real, TIME (Mar. 27, 
2014), http://time.com/40110/rape-culture-is-real/ [https://perma.cc/BB9E-3BF5] 
(defining what rape culture is and how slut-shaming affects society). 
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member when the injury occurred.231 In previous Feres cases, courts 
have seemingly glossed over the actual incident that resulted in the 
injury to decide whether it fits within the Feres Doctrine analysis.232 
Instead, courts have opted for determining the basis for Feres Doctrine 
application on the service member’s duty status and on whether their 
judicial interference would disrupt military cohesion and discipline.233 
But, in determining whether an injury is incident to the service 
member’s service, the court must analyze and discuss the facts and 
circumstances surrounding the injury.234 The Feres Court used the 
word “incident” in its decision regarding the relationship of the injury 
and the service activity because it logically follows that the injury 
flows from the service, which serves a military purpose or goal.235 
Therefore, in determining this second step, courts must look at 
whether the activity served a military purpose or goal and whether the 
injury was a foreseeable consequence of that military purpose or goal.  
a. Serving a Military Purpose or Goal 
Examining the actual language of the FTCA from which the 
Feres Doctrine is derived, the Act explicitly excludes injuries that are 
the result of “combatant activities.”236 Combatant activities are most 
likely to be those in which the service member is asked to use force 
against an adversary.237 These adversaries are most often not enemies 
                                                   
 231. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j) (1948). Since the Act specifically 
mentions “combatant activities . . . during time of war,” the actual activity of the 
service member at the time of the injury is a material element Congress created to 
determine whether liability is barred. Id.; see also Brown v. United States, 739 F.2d 
362, 367 (8th Cir. 1984) (explaining that the nature of the activity from which the 
injury resulted must be examined to determine whether a relevant relationship existed 
between the service member’s activity and his or her military service).  
 232. See United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 57 (1985) (deciding that the 
injuries to the victim were not as important as whether the decision to allow the claim 
to proceed would interfere with military decision-making). 
 233. See id.  
 234. See Pringle v. United States, 44 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1173 (Kan. D. Ct. 
1999) (explaining that when a court examines a Feres question, they must do so by 
reviewing the totality of the facts and circumstances surrounding the injury).  
 235. See Incident, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/ 
definition/incident [https://perma.cc/H76B-3D3M] (last visited Nov. 26, 2018) 
(defining “incident” to mean “[l]iable to happen because of; resulting from”). 
 236. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j). The provisions of the FTCA shall not apply to “[a]ny 
claim arising out of the combatant activities of the military or naval forces, or the 
Coast Guard, during time of war.” Id. 
 237. See Johnson v. United States, 170 F.2d 767, 770 (9th Cir. 1948) (defining 
“combatant” to mean activities, not limited to violence, both necessary to and in direct 
connection with actual hostilities).  
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within the United States military itself,238 and these activities serve the 
military purpose and goal of national security.239 Therefore, injuries 
that are the result of wartime fighting, combat training, or those that 
are caused by an enemy adversary are clear examples of the type of 
injury Congress sought to bar from litigation.240 Essentially, if the 
activity can be traced back to a military goal or purpose, only then 
should the Feres Doctrine control.241  
Proponents of using the existing Feres Doctrine for cases of 
sexual assault claim that the Feres Doctrine restricts military second-
guessing, which in turn serves the military goal of autonomous 
decision making.242 This ideology can be seen within military 
leadership, as well as within the courts themselves.243 The notable shift 
from the original rationale in Feres to the current deference to military 
decision-making makes it clear that there is a fear of civilian courts 
interfering in the way the military decides to conduct itself.244 Courts 
have stated on numerous occasions within Feres decisions that the 
courts do not want military leadership second-guessing itself during 
missions and training exercises out of fear of being hauled into a 
civilian court to provide and explanation for its actions or decisions.245 
                                                   
 238. See id.; see also § 2680(k) (detailing the Act’s exception to injuries that 
occurred abroad, further strengthening the argument that combatant activities are 
those that happen against a foreign enemy as opposed to enemies within one’s own 
army).  
 239. See Who We Are, U.S. ARMY, https://www.army.mil/info/organization/ 
[https://perma.cc/2H26-HUSD] (last visited Nov. 26, 2018). “The U.S. Army’s 
mission is to fight and win our Nation’s wars by providing prompt, sustained land 
dominance across the full range of military operations and spectrum of conflict in 
support of combatant commanders.” Id.  
 240. See Doe v. Hagenbeck, 870 F.3d 36, 59 (2d Cir. 2017) (Chin, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that claims that “call into question ‘the military judgments and 
decisions that are inextricably intertwined with the conduct of the military mission’” 
are claims that ought to be barred (quoting U.S. v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 691 
(1987))). 
 241. See Kelly v. Panama Canal Comm’n, 26 F.3d 597, 600 (5th Cir. 1999) 
(stating that activities that serve a military function would fall under Feres scrutiny).  
 242. See Cioca v. Rumsfeld, 720 F.3d 505, 514 (4th Cir. 2013) (explaining 
that while the sexual assault allegations are disturbing, allowing the claims to continue 
would challenge military decision-making). 
 243. See generally United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52 (1985); Doe v. 
Hagenbeck, 870 F.3d 36 (2d Cir. 2017) (citing military decision-making and the 
importance of maintaining good order in their reliance on the Feres Doctrine); Brown 
v. United States, 739 F.2d 362 (8th Cir. 1984).  
 244. See Shearer, 473 U.S. at 58 (condemning the possibility of a civilian 
court ignorantly overlooking military decisions and commands). 
 245. See Committee Hearing, supra note 26, at 8 (commenting on the 
possibility of diminished military effectiveness due to civilian court interference in 
the statement of Paul Harris, Deputy Associate Attorney General, Department of 
Justice).  
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Further, many politicians and military leaders have gone on record to 
disparage the idea that civilian courts have any possible insight into 
how the military should conduct itself.246  
However, while military discipline and cohesion are obviously 
important aspects to the overarching goal of national security, shutting 
the courthouse doors to military personnel who have suffered at the 
hands of military rapists and sexual assaulters diminishes military 
discipline and cohesion.247 Additionally, the cost to unit cohesion, 
order, and discipline is dramatically diminished when a sexual assault 
survivor is not able to recover through the court system.248 When a 
service member is sexually assaulted by one of the military’s own, 
loyalty and trust are immediately destroyed.249 When nothing is done 
about the assault or if judicial recourse is not available, unit cohesion, 
discipline, and order are negatively affected, which could be the 
difference between life and death in a war zone.250 Essentially, in 
attempting to protect military effectiveness by limiting civil recourse 
for sexual assault, the military and the courts are actually hindering 
it.251  
Moreover, sexual assault has its roots in rape culture that draws 
its strength from power struggles between victim and perpetrator.252 
When a person sexually violates another—male or female—that 
person is asserting power and dominance over the victim.253 This toxic 
power struggle is not, and should not be, a recognized goal of the 
military.254 Because the activities of sexual assault and rape do not 
                                                   
 246. See id.; see also id. at 4 (explaining that maintaining good order was a 
main reason he supports Feres in the statement Rear Admiral Christopher E. Weaver, 
Rear Admiral and Commandant, Naval District Washington, D.C.). 
 247. See Farris, Schell, & Tanielian, supra note 209 (explaining the effects of 
military sexual assault on a survivor). 
 248. See generally LINDSAY ROSENTHAL & LAWRENCE KORB, TWICE 
BETRAYED: BRINGING JUSTICE TO THE U.S. MILITARY’S SEXUAL ASSAULT PROBLEM, 
CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS (Nov. 2013) (arguing the substantial costs to the 
military when sexual assault is ignored or not taken seriously). 
 249. See Farris, Schell, & Tanielian, supra note 209 (denoting the effects of 
military sexual assault on military effectiveness). 
 250. See id.  
 251. See generally Rachel Natelson, The Unfairness of the Feres Doctrine, 
TIME (Feb. 25, 2013), http://nation.time.com/2013/02/25/the-unfairness-of-the-feres-
doctrine/#ixzz2SkR0sdEb [https://perma.cc/U2GF-R2JQ] (detailing how the Feres 
Doctrine has affected Ariana Klay’s, the plaintiff in Klay v. Panetta, pursuit of 
justice). 
 252. See Gabrielle Lucero, Military Sexual Assault: Reporting and Rape 
Culture, 6 SANFORD J. PUB. POL’Y 1, 4-5 (2015) (defining rape culture). 
 253. See id. at 5 (explaining “that sexual violence is not about sexual 
gratification, but about power and control”).  
 254. See id.  
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serve a military purpose or goal, the analysis must then cease and 
allow for service members to bring claims against the military.255 Even 
if courts determine that sexual assault and rape are not activities but 
are instead injuries, the new Feres Doctrine analysis would still fail in 
cases involving sexual assault and rape.256After determining whether a 
military goal or purpose is present in a particular case, courts must 
then determine whether the specific injury was a foreseeable 
consequence of that goal or purpose. 
b. The Injury Was a Foreseeable Consequence of the Military 
Goal or Purpose  
After determining that the activity was one that serves a military 
goal or purpose, courts should then determine whether the injury was 
a foreseeable consequence of that military goal or purpose.257 The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit applied the 
respondeat superior doctrine as it relates to workers’ compensation in 
order to better analyze the foreseeability of injuries that are incident to 
service.258 The court concluded that since the Feres Doctrine bars 
claims for injuries that arise out of activities incident to service and 
because “arising out of or in the course of employment” is a defined 
meaning for workers’ compensation claims, the test for both should be 
interpreted in similar ways.259 The Taber test asks whether the service 
member engaged in activities that fell within the scope of his or her 
military employment.260 If the answer is yes—the service member did 
engage in activities that fell within the scope—then the Feres Doctrine 
                                                   
 255. See ROSENTHAL & KORB, supra note 248, at 10. “Our profession is built 
on a bedrock of trust—the trust must inherently exist among soldiers, and between 
soldiers and their leaders to accomplish their mission in  
the chaos of war. Recent incidents of sexual assault and sexual harassment 
demonstrate that we have violated that trust.” Id. (quoting General Ray Odierno 
testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee).  
 256. See Rochelle Rubin Weber, “Scope of Employment” Redefined: Holding 
Employers Vicariously Liable for Sexual Assaults Committed by Their Employees, 76 
MINN. L. REV. 1513, 1514 n.5 (1992) (citing cases that have determined that sexual 
assault is outside the scope of employment).  
 257. See Taber v. Maine, 67 F.3d 1029, 1050 (2d Cir. 1995) (connecting the 
foreseeability logic of workers’ compensation payments to military injuries under 
Feres). 
 258. See id. at 1049.  
 259. Id. at 1049-50.  
 260. See id. at 1050. “[W]e conclude that in assessing whether a military 
plaintiff’s FTCA claim is barred, the court should proceed by considering the same 
question that would determine whether the plaintiff would be entitled to receive 
standard workers’ compensation payments for his injury . . . .” Id.  
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applies and bars the claim.261 If the answer is no, then the Feres 
Doctrine does not apply, and the claim should be allowed to proceed.262 
For incidents where the injury is sexual assault or rape, courts have 
decided that the activity falls outside the scope of one’s employment, 
a trigger for worker’s compensation feasibility.263 Thus, the proper 
application of this test will impose a per se bar on Feres Doctrine 
application to sexual assault and rape claims—the standard previously 
used.264  
Critics of proposed Feres Doctrine changes believe that 
Congress should be responsible for solving the problems the Doctrine 
and the applications it has created.265 In the original Feres decision, the 
Court placed the responsibility of clarifying the Doctrine on 
Congress’s shoulders as the author of the FTCA.266 This idea has 
continued to manifest itself in pro-Feres decisions as a defense to the 
growing criticism.267 However, passing legislation through Congress 
is a laborious and arduous process with very little change made in a 
                                                   
 261. See id. In answering yes, the court compares the scenario to the workers’ 
compensation entitlements. See id. If the service member would be entitled to recover 
workers’ compensation payments, the Feres Doctrine would bar them from bringing 
a claim. See id.  
 262. See id. The court conversely stated that a service member’s claim should 
be allowed to proceed if they would not be able to recover worker’s compensation 
payments for their injuries. See id.  
 263. See Jim Pocius, Workers Compensation and Course of Employment, 
INT’L RISK MGMT. INST. INC. (Feb. 2001), https://www.irmi.com/articles/expert-
commentary/workers-compensation-and-course-of-employment 
[https://perma.cc/C75G-U7W8] (explaining that all workers’ compensation laws 
require that the employee be within the course of employment in order to receive 
benefits); see also Weber, supra note 256, at 1520-22 nn.33-34 (explaining that many 
jurisdictions focus on the employee’s personal motivation to commit sexual assault 
and the unexpected nature of the activity in determining that the employer cannot be 
held liable).  
 264. See Taber, 67 F.3d at 1050. If sexual assault falls outside the scope of 
employment, then Feres will not bar those claims. See id.  
 265. See Committee Hearing, supra note 26, at 4 (referencing the statement of 
Rear Admiral Christopher E. Weaver, Rear Admiral and Commandant, Naval District 
Washington, Washington, D.C.); see also Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 139 
(1950) (placing the responsibility of changing Feres on Congress). “[T]he Feres 
Doctrine is important to maintaining good order and discipline in the military . . . 
[l]litigation is inherently divisive and disruptive.” Committee Hearing, supra note 26, 
at 4 (referencing the statement of Rear Admiral Christopher E. Weaver, Rear Admiral 
and Commandant, Naval District Washington, Washington, D.C.). 
 266. See Feres, 340 U.S. at 139. “These considerations . . . should persuade us 
to cast upon Congress, as author of the confusion, the task of qualifying and clarifying 
its language.” Id. 
 267. See Hagenbeck, 870 F.3d at 50; see also Shearer, 473 U.S. at 57. 
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short period of time.268 Thus, because Congress’s language in the 
FTCA is unambiguous, and because the Supreme Court created the 
Feres controversy, it should be the Supreme Court’s responsibility to 
rectify the error in interpretation.269 
Moreover, Congress was quite clear in its intent concerning who 
can sue the military, when persons may sue, and for what persons can 
sue.270 Looking again at the original intent of Feres and the FTCA, 
Congress wanted to maintain a semblance of autonomy for military 
decision-making.271 For example, when a service member is on the 
front lines of battle—a highly dangerous and chaotic area where 
anything can go wrong—a gunshot wound or injury from an explosion 
is a completely foreseeable injury.272 This element must go hand in 
hand with the military goal or purpose, meaning that the foreseeable 
injury must be in the same nexus as that goal or purpose.273 Turning to 
the specific injuries of sexual assault and rape, while a service member 
may be in a particular location or situation for the military goal of 
national security, sexual assault and rape can never be viewed as a risk 
the service member was foreseeably assuming.274 
B. Justice for Doe and Beyond 
Doe v. Hagenbeck is one of the latest circuit court cases on 
military sexual assault and the application of the Feres Doctrine, 
                                                   
 268. See Committee Hearing, supra note 26, at 24 (referencing the statement 
of United States Senator Patrick J. Leahy, which explains that just because Congress 
has not passed new legislation on the matter does not mean it agrees with the courts’ 
interpretation). 
 269. See United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 703 (1987) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (explaining that although the case before them has not explicitly asked the 
Court to reverse Feres, the doctrine was wrongly decided, and it should not be 
extended).  
 270. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1948) (detailing the provision in the Act).  
 271. See § 2680 (providing multiple exceptions to the general rule that service 
members may sue the United States government). 
 272. See For Military, Different Wars Mean Different Injuries, NPR (June 8, 
2011, 4:54 PM), https://www.npr.org/2011/06/12/137066281/for-military-different-
wars-mean-different-injuries [https://perma.cc/F6TZ-YECF] (explaining that in 
today’s modern warfare soldiers can be brutalized in a variety of different ways by 
encountering gunshots and explosives). 
 273. See Scott Glotzer, Maheshwari v. City of New York, 50 N.Y. L. SCH. L. 
REV. 833, 835 (2006). This nexus can be likened to the connection between 
foreseeability and proximate cause in tort law. See id. at 846.  
 274. See Lucero, supra note 252, at 4 (stating that rape culture causes 
misconceptions about how and why rape occurs, and who gets raped). 
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making the Doctrine ripe for review by the Supreme Court.275 Thus, if 
the Court grants a petition for certiorari, the Court should use the 
proposed Feres Doctrine analysis to ensure justice and fairness for 
Doe and to set a precedent for future military sexual assault cases.276 
First, to determine whether to examine a Doe’s claim under the Feres 
microscope, the Court must identify her duty status at the time of the 
injury.277 At the time of her assault, Doe was a West Point cadet and 
an active duty member of the United States Army.278 Thus, Doe’s 
status as an active duty member of the military places her on the 
extreme end of the duty status spectrum and squarely within the gates 
of the Feres Doctrine analysis.279 
Under this framework, the Court would next have to decide 
whether the activity that caused the injury served a military goal and 
whether the injury was a foreseeable consequence of that military 
goal.280 Doe’s injuries were the result of a rape perpetrated by one of 
her fellow cadets.281 Looking specifically at the rape, it is obvious that 
it does not serve a military goal in any way.282 If the Court decided to 
look more broadly, it would see that Doe’s walk around campus at 
1:00 a.m. immediately preceding the incident cannot not be seen as 
serving a military goal because it took place after hours and in 
violation of the school’s curfew rules.283 Thus, Doe’s injuries were not 
the result of an activity that served a military goal or purpose, thereby 
                                                   
 275. See generally Doe v. Hagenbeck, 870 F.3d 36 (4th Cir. 2017) 
(referencing the August 30, 2017 decision date). 
 276. See supra Subsection III.A.2.a-b. (detailing the proposed changes to the 
Feres Doctrine analysis). 
 277. See supra Subsection III.A.2.a. (explaining that the Feres Doctrine 
analysis must begin with the duty status to determine whether the analysis must 
continue). 
 278. See Hagenbeck, 870 F.3d at 39 (“As a West Point cadet, Doe was a 
member of the Army.”); see also 10 U.S.C. § 3075 (1956) (explaining that cadets of 
the U.S. Military Academy are a part of the Regular Army and, thus, are on active 
duty). 
 279. See Warren, supra note 226 and accompanying text (explaining that the 
service member’s duty status should not the sole reason a service member is not 
permitted to bring a suit against the military). 
 280. See supra Subsection III.A.2.b. (explaining that if the activity served a 
military purpose or goal, then the injury must be a foreseeable consequence of the 
military purpose or goal for the Feres Doctrine to bar the claim). 
 281. See Hagenbeck, 870 F.3d at 39 (describing the rape that took place after 
hours on May 9, 2010). 
 282. See id. at 59 (Chin, J., dissenting) (explaining that the relationship 
between Doe’s rape and a military goal is too attenuated). 
 283. See id. at 39 (describing the activity as a violation of West Point rules). 
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ending the Feres analysis.284 However, if the Court decided that one of 
the aforementioned activities served a military goal—most likely the 
walk around campus—then it must determine whether the injury was 
a foreseeable consequence.285 Because Doe’s injury would fall outside 
the scope of employment for workers’ compensation benefits, she 
would not be able to receive payments if she was operating within that 
schema—essentially making her injury an unforeseeable 
consequence.286 Because of this unforeseeable consequence, the Feres 
Doctrine would not bar Doe’s claims against General Hagenbeck and 
General Brigadier Rapp.287 Further, holding that sexual assault and 
rape are foreseeable consequences to taking walks on campuses would 
only further the pervasive sexual harassment and victim-blaming rape 
culture within the military.288  
This potential holding would do more than allow Doe to recover 
from the administrative powers who allowed her sexual assault to 
occur.289 In fact, the issue of sexual assault and holding enablers 
accountable reaches farther than the military sector.290 The wave of 
accountability has crashed into industries like athletics, music, film, 
and academia.291 The civilian courts provide recourse for civilian 
                                                   
 284. See supra notes 210-222 and accompanying text (explaining that the 
Feres analysis ends once the activity that led to the injury has been found to not serve 
a military purpose or goal). 
 285. See supra Subsection III.A.2.b. (explaining that the next step in the 
analysis, the Taber element, asks whether the injury would result in workers’ 
compensation benefits in parallel circumstances). 
 286. See Taber v. Maine, 67 F.3d 1029, 1049-50 (2d Cir. 1995); see also 
Weber, supra note 256, at 1514 (explaining that courts have held that sexual assault 
is outside the scope of employment).  
 287. See Subsection III.A.2.b. (stating that if a service member’s claim would 
fail under the workers’ compensation doctrine of “arising out of or in the course of 
employment,” then that claim is not barred by the Feres Doctrine).  
 288. See Hagenbeck, 870 F.3d at 52 (providing examples of the victim 
blaming culture within the military academy).  
 289. See BriGette McCoy, The Military’s Sexual Assault Response Is a 
Catastrophic Blight on Our Service, GUARDIAN (May 2, 2014), 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/may/02/us-military-sexual-
assault-response [https://perma.cc/73PV-H37G] (explaining how changes to the 
current system, both inside and outside of military, would have positive results for 
survivors). 
 290. See Sophie Gilbert, The Movement of #MeToo, ATLANTIC (Oct. 16, 
2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2017/10/the-movement-
of-metoo/542979/ [https://perma.cc/G38G-Y7M2] (detailing how the #MeToo 
movement started from Hollywood industry leaders speaking out about their sexual 
assaults at the hands of influential people like Harvey Weinstein).  
 291. See id. This movement shows that sexual assault is wide spread, and 
many people have their own #MeToo stories to tell in a variety of industries and 
sectors. See id. 
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litigants who seek to change the rape culture pervasive in American 
society.292 By interpreting the Feres Doctrine in this way, Doe’s case 
has the potential to afford military litigants the same chance at 
changing the system within which they work.293  
CONCLUSION 
It should be the job of the Court to rectify the misunderstanding 
and inconsistent meanings of the “incident to service” analysis for 
lower courts to follow.294 Leaving the issue open without a guidepost 
to analyze specific cases unjustly harms the survivors of heinous acts 
like sexual assault and rape.295 Sexual assault should not be seen as a 
risk that a service member has assumed when deciding to become a 
protector of the United States.296 Therefore, the Court, upon the 
potential review of Hagenbeck, should ask whether the activity that 
resulted in Doe’s injury served a military purpose or goal and whether 
the injury was a foreseeable consequence of that military purpose or 
goal to ensure justice for survivors of military sexual assault.297 
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